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We examine how electoral motives influence active labor market policies that promote job-
creation.  Such  policies  reduce  unemployment  statistics.  Using  German  state  data  for  the 
period  1985  to  2004,  we  show  that  election-motivated  politicians  pushed  job-promotion 
schemes before elections.  
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Electoral motives can influence economic policy. In particular, politicians have been shown to 
behave opportunistically before elections (e.g., Nordhaus 1975, Rogoff and Sibert 1988) to 
increase  their  re-election  prospects.  More  recent  studies  show  no  electoral  cycles  in 
unemployment or inflation, but in economic performance and in policies such as government 
expenditures. By using  panel data,  electoral cycles have been shown in OECD countries, 
across states or provinces in federal states and also across municipalities.
1 
Unemployment has been shown to be an important indicator of government popularity 
(e.g, Lewis-Beck and Paldam 2000, Mueller 2003). Voters tend to be little informed about the 
state of the (macro) economy (e.g., Caplan 2007, pp. 80), but make reasonable assessments 
about unemployment (Concover et al. 1986, Paldam and Nannestad 2000, Davidson et al. 
2010).  Governments  can  directly  decrease  unemployment  by  using  Active  Labor  Market 
Policies  (ALMP).  Individuals  employed  in  ALMP  measures  immediately  drop  out  of  the 
unemployment  statistics  in  countries  such  as  Germany.  ALMP  therefore  lowers 
unemployment figures, at least in the short-run, in a direct way. Many European governments 
have implemented ALMP programs.
2 Because of the political benefits, electoral manipulation 
seems  likely  through  ALMP.  We  study  whether  there  has  been  political  manipulation  of 
ALMP, using German state data for the period 1985 to 2004. Our results show that election-
motivated politicians used ALMP (job-creation schemes) to reduce unemployment statistics 
before  elections.  The  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  2  presents  the  institutional 
                                                 
1 Electoral cycles have been shown, for example, in OECD countries (Katsimi and Sarantidis 2011, Potrafke 
2011),  the German states (Schneider 2010, Tepe and Vanhuysse 2009), Canadian provinces (Blais and Nadeau 
1992, Reid 1998, Tellier 2006), Portugese municipalities (Veiga and Veiga 2007, Aidt et al. 2011), Brazilian 
municipalities  (Sakurai  and  Menezes-Filho  2008,  2011),  French  municipalities  (Foucault  et  al.  2008).  For 
country studies see, for example, Grier (2008), Berger and Woitek (1997), Belke (2000), Batool and Sieg (2009). 
2 To be sure: the success of ALMP programs is ambiguous and varies across countries. In Switzerland and 
Germany, for example, ALMP programs hardly  shortened unemployment duration (Lalive et al. 2008, Hagen 
and Steiner 2000, Fertig et al. 2006). In Poland, training programs have increased the probability of individual 
employment,  whereas  wage  subsidies  have  had  a  negative  influence  on  individual  employment  probability 
(Kluve et al. 2008). Using data from Denmark, Graversen and van Ours (2008) find positive activation program 
effects on unemployment duration and job finding rates. The ambiguity of  ALMP success notwithstanding, 
politicians have implemented ALMP programs for a long time.  3 
 
background. Section 3 describes the empirical strategy. Section 4 presents the results and 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Institutional background: active labor market policies in Germany 
Active labor market policies are intended to reintegrate unemployed persons into the labor 
market, for example, by subsidising wages or by means of job-creation schemes.
3 ALMP 
programs in Germany are supervised by the Federal Employment Agency (Bundesagentur für 
Arbeit,  FEA).  Historically,  ALMP  programs  were  an  important  innovation  of  the  Job 
Promotion  Act  (AFG,  Arbeitsförderungsgesetz),  which  formed  the  legal  basis  for  labor 
market  policies  in  Germany  in  the  1969-1997  period.  In  1998,  the  Social  Code 
(Sozialgesetzbuch, SGB) III was adopted with the intention to intensify ALMP. ALMP does 
not only play a role at the federal level, however. In practice, it is not only the FEA that 
implements  ALMP,  but  above  all,  the  states  or  Laender  Employment  Agencies 
(Landesanstalten,  LEA)  (for  further  details  on  labor  market  policies  in  Germany  and  the 
institutional  set-up  of  job-creation  schemes  see,  e.g.,  Thomsen  2007,  p.  16).  The  state 
governments can implement their preferred labor market policies by subsidizing particular 
ALMPs with funds from their own budgets and by setting administrative guidelines in the 
LEAs. Political decision makers and high ranking civil servants in the LEAs cooperate in 
implementation. Politicians may also place friendly party members in responsible positions in 
the  LEAs.
4  Beyond  the  programs  initiated  by  the  LEAs  and  the  local  agencies,  a  state 
government can implement additional ALMP measures.  
                                                 
3 There are several ALMP instruments which broadly remained the same but were extended over time. Thomsen 
(2007) refers to the SGB III as a legal basis and distinguishes between “Measures to Enhance and Adjust the 
Qualification  of  the  Individuals”,  “Counselling  and  Assistance  for  Regional  and  Vocational  Mobility”,  and 
“Subsidised  Employment”.  The  latter  category  consists  of  wage  subsidies  and  two  groups  of  employment 
programs, namely job-creation schemes and structural adjustment schemes. They both establish the so-called 
second labor market. 
4 Local authorities also play an important role in ALMP because they arrange new jobs, find positions for 
unemployed persons and locally negotiate with the so called “Traeger”, but they are not responsible for the 
budget decisions. 4 
 
ALMP programs began in the beginning of the 1980s in the former West German 
states. We focus on this group of 10 states. In particular, we examine job-creation schemes 
until 2004 for two reasons: first, job-creation schemes were a prominent policy instrument but 
became  less  important  after  the  end  of  2004.  We  do  not  include  later  years  because  of 
structural  reforms  of  the  German  labor  market  by  the  so-called  Hartz-laws,  which  were 
introduced in the beginning of 2005.  Second, job-creation schemes are the ALMP measure 
for which the best and most comparable data is available in Germany. There are a number of 
other ALMP measures, but their names and structure changed over time and they are not 
necessarily comparable between states. Data on total ALMP spending at the states level are 
not available. We therefore use the number of individuals in job-creation schemes as a proxy 
for the governments’ ALMP activities.  
 
3. Data and empirical strategy 
3.1 Data and variables 
We  employ  monthly  data  for  the  number  of  individuals  treated  in  job-creation  schemes 
provided by Germany's Federal Employment Office. The data covers the period 1985:1 to 
2004:11 for the ten former West German states. We do not include the former East German 
states and also do not consider Berlin because it was divided before the German unification 
and therefore the data contain a structural break. 
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the number of individuals in job-creation schemes and the 
number of unemployed persons from 1985:1 to 2004:11. The number of individuals in job-
creation schemes and unemployment was subject to a seasonal pattern. Unemployment was 
higher in winter than in summer, whereas the cyclical pattern of the job-creation schemes has 
been time-delayed. There were also differences in time and between the individual states. For 
example, unemployment as well as the number of job-creation schemes decreased at the end 5 
 
of the 1980s and reached a minimum after the German unification in 1990. Subsequently, 
both increased steadily in almost all German states. Overall, we control for these effects using 
fixed year, monthly, and state dummies in the econometric model. 
Further  explanatory  variables  such  as  total  population  or  the  number  of  employed 
persons  are  not  available  on  a  monthly  basis.  We  therefore  cannot  scale  the  job-creation 
schemes and unemployment. However, referring to annual population data in the states, the 
ratio  of  unemployed  persons  to  total  population  was,  on  average,  about  4.1%,  with  a 
minimum of 1.5% and a maximum of 8.8%. Regarding the relationship between the number 
of individuals in job-creation schemes and the number of unemployed persons, there was, on 
average, approximately one job-creation scheme per 30 unemployed persons, with a minimum 
of one job-creation scheme per 400 and a maximum of one per seven unemployed persons.  
 
3.2 The empirical model 
The base-line panel data model has the following form: 
 
∆ ln individuals in job-creation schemesiym = α1 Electioniym + α2 Post-Electioniym  
 
+ β Leftiym +  λm + γy + ηi + uiym 
 
with i = 1,...,10; ; m = 1,...,12; y = 1985,...,2004. 
 
 
The dependent variable ∆ ln individuals in job-creation schemesiym denotes the growth rate in 
the number of individuals treated in job-creation schemes in every individual state i, month m 
and year y.
5 Panel unit root tests show that this variable is stationary. The variable Electioniym 
captures the timing of the elections. It assumes the value of one in the twelve months before 
an election and zero otherwise. We use this electoral variable as a benchmark. For robustness 
                                                 
5 We use the number of individuals in job-creation schemes instead of the inflows into job-creation schemes as 
the measures vary in duration. 6 
 
checks, we also apply different codings such as ten and eight months before the elections.  
Post-Electioniym assumes the value of one in the twelve months after an election and zero 
otherwise.  There  are  no  fixed  election  dates  across  the  German  states  and  the  legislative 
periods last four or five years. However, early elections may be called. So far, about 8% of the 
elections in the German states were early elections. We address the early election issue in the 
robustness checks section.  
To account for differences between leftist and rightwing governments, we include the 
variable  “Left”.
6  Two  major  political  parties  have  dominated  the  political  spectrum  in 
Germany:  the  leftist  Social  Democratic  Party  (SPD)  and  the  conservative  Christian 
Democratic  Union  (CDU).  In  Bavaria,  Germany's  largest  federal  state  by  area,  the 
conservatives are not represented by the CDU but by their sister party, the Christian Social 
Party (CSU). CDU and CSU do not compete and they form a single faction in the federal 
parliament (Bundestag). This is why we use the label CDU for both parties in the empirical 
analysis. All federal chancellors and state prime ministers were members of one of these two 
major blocks, SPD and CDU. Therefore, one can test for ideology-induced effects on this left-
right dimension. The variable “Left” assumes the value of one in periods when a SPD Prime 
Minister was in office and the SPD did not form a coalition with the CDU (grand coalition), 
the value 0.5 when SPD and CDU formed a joint coalition (we do not distinguish whether the 
SPD or the CDU appointed the Prime Minister) and zero otherwise.
7 For robustness tests we 
replace the variable “Left” by individual coalition type dummies. λm describes fixed monthly, 
                                                 
6  Politicians  with  different  ideologies  may  well  behave  opportunistically  before  elections,  but  implement 
economic policies in line with their party color during the legislative period (Frey and Schneider 1978a and 
1978b). By employing OECD panel data, the results by Goerke et al. (2010) suggest that leftwing governments 
increased unemployment benefits. Leftwing governments did not, however, increase the growth rate of ALMP 
spending in OECD countries (Potrafke 2010).  
7 The much smaller Free Democratic Party (FDP) and Green party (GR) have played an important role as 
coalition partners in the former Western states. While the SPD has formed coalitions with all the other three 
parties,  the  CDU  never  formed  a  coalition  with  the  Greens  on  the  federal  or  state  level  during  the  period 
analyzed in this paper. We will also consider the influence of the different coalition types, because the left-right 
dimension may neglect ideological differences between government parties within a “camp” (e.g. for the Left 
between SPD/FDP and SPD/GR coalitions). As minority governments and other government formations have 
played a negligible role, they will be subsumed under the coalition types mentioned above. 7 
 
γy fixed year
8, and ηi fixed state effects.
9 Table 1 shows descriptive statistics of all variables 
included. 
The  basic  model  is  initially  estimated  by  feasible  generalized  least  squares  in  a 
common fixed effects framework. We apply heteroskedastic and autocorrelation consistent 
(HAC)  Newey-West  type  standard  errors  and  variance-covariance  estimates  (Newey  and 
West 1987, Stock and Watson 2008), because the Wooldridge test for serial correlation in the 
idiosyncratic errors of a linear panel-data model implies the existence of strong arbitrary serial 
correlation (Wooldridge 2002, p. 176-177).  
The number of individuals in job-creation schemes is directly related to the number of 
unemployed  persons  since  job-creation  schemes  are  often  used  in  reaction  to  high 
unemployment. We therefore include the lagged number of unemployed persons in a further 
step. We address the persistence and remaining seasonality of the dependent variable and the 
time-delayed  interaction  of  unemployed  persons  and  job-creation  schemes  by  including  a 
battery of lagged dependent variables and lags of the unemployment variable. For further 
robustness checks, we also aggregate the monthly data to annual data and include additional 
economic control variables that are only available on an annual basis such as total population 
and the number of firms. 
 
4. Results 
4.1 Basic results 
Table 2 shows the regression results of the base-line model with monthly data. In 
column (1) we have only included the political variables. In column (2) we have included a 
battery  of  lags  of  the  dependent  variable  and  the  number  of  unemployed  persons  (24 
additional  variables  are  included:  lag  1-12  of  the  dependent  variable  and  the  number  of 
                                                 
8 The fixed year effects also control for specific historical events such as the German unification. 
9 We exclude one of the fixed effect variables, respectively, in order to avoid perfect collinearity problems. 8 
 
unemployed persons respectively). In a dynamic estimation with lagged dependent variables, 
the common fixed-effect estimator is biased by 1/T (Nickell-bias). In our case with T bigger 
than 200 the Nickell-bias can be ignored. GMM-estimators are also biased for small N, so that 
we  do  not  apply  them  with  N=10.  Column  (3)  refers  to  regressions  in  which  we  have 
excluded lagged variables that lack statistical significance. Only the first lag of the dependent 
variable remains statistically significant, the four months lagged number of unemployment 
persons  just  fails  statistical  significance  at  the  10%  level.  The  first  lag  is  statistically 
significant at the 1% level and the coefficient reveals an elasticity of about 0.4. In any event, 
the inclusion of the lagged dependent variables and the lagged number of unemployed persons 
does not affect our inferences regarding the political variables at all. 
In accordance with the predictions of the PBC theory, politicians increased the growth 
rate of the number of individuals in job-creation schemes before elections. The coefficient of 
the election variable tells us that before elections in the German states, the growth rate of the 
job-creation schemes increased by about 0.4% per month. The coefficient of the election year 
variable is statistically significant at the 10% level in columns (1) and (3) and at the 5% level 
in  column  (2).  In  contrast,  the  post-election  variable  does  not  turn  out  to  be  statistically 
significant in columns (1) to (3).  This finding shows that politicians manipulated the growth 
rate of job-creation schemes before and not even after elections. An explanation why the post-
election variable does not have a significantly negative influence on the growth rate of job-
creation  schemes  may  be  the  duration  of  these  measures  which  on  average  was  twelve 
months. The coefficient of the ideology variable also does not turn out to be statistically 
significant.  
 
4.2 Robustness tests 
Elections  can  be  irregular  (early)  (Brender  and  Drazen  2005,  Shi  and  Svensson  2006). 
Following Shi and Svensson's (2006, p. 1374) identification strategy, an election is classified 9 
 
as regular (predetermined) if either (i) the election is held on the fixed date (year) specified by 
the constitution; or (ii) the election is held in the last year of a constitutionally fixed term; or 
(iii) the election is announced at least a  year in advance.  In our sample, 8% of the state 
elections need to be classified as early. We replace the election year variable by one variable 
for regular and one for early elections. The coefficients of the regular election-year variables 
are statistically significant at the 5% level in columns (1) to (4) of Table 3 and again indicate 
that  politicians  behaved  opportunistically  to  become  re-elected.  The  early  election-year 
variables do not turn out to be statistically significant.  A reason may be that it needs time to 
implement  job-creation  schemes.  Having  an  early  election,  the  time  span  from  the 
announcement to the election might be too short.  
Columns (2) and (4) in Table 3 show results where we have replaced the variable 
“Left”  by  coalition  type  dummy  variables  which  do  not  turn  out  to  be  statistically 
significant.
10 An exception is the CDU/SPD dummy variable which is statistically significant 
at the 1% level. The coefficients suggest that the growth rate of job-creation schemes under 
CDU/SPD  (grand  coalition)  governments  was  about  0.3%  higher  than  under  pure  SPD 
governments (reference category). In any event, replacing the variable “Left” by coalition 
type  dummy  variables  does  not  change  the  inferences  regarding  the  election  variables 
(inferences also do not change when we use the common election and post-election variable). 
Federal  elections  may  also  influence  ALMP  in  the  German  states.  The  reason  is 
twofold: (1) the federal governments can also implement job-creation schemes and (2) the 
chancellor can encourage the Prime Ministers in the states (governors) that belong to his party 
to boost ALMP effort in order increase his re-election chances at the federal level. We have 
                                                 
10 The coalition type dummies take the value of one when the specified coalition type was in power and zero 
otherwise.  We  distinguish  between  six  different  coalition  types:  CDU,  CDU/FDP,  CDU/SPD,  SPD/FDP, 
SPD/GR, and SPD. With respect to the grand coalitions (CDU/SPD), we do not distinguish which of the two 
parties appointed the Prime Minister. To avoid perfect collinearity between the coalition type dummies, one of 
the coalition type dummies must function as the reference category (here SPD). The estimated effects of the 
other coalition type dummies then need to be interpreted as deviations from the reference category. 
 10 
 
therefore included a  federal election dummy that assumes the value of one in the twelve 
months before a federal election and is zero otherwise. Table 4 shows that the federal election 
dummy is statistically significant at the 1% level. The numerical meaning is significant: the 
coefficient of the federal election dummy is about three times as big as the coefficient of the 
state election dummy variable. Notice that including the federal election dummy does not 
change the estimated value and the statistical significance of the state election dummy. 
We have replaced the base-line election dummy variables (which assume the value 1 
in the 12 months preceding an election) by election dummy variables that take the value of 
one in the ten and eight months before the election (and zero otherwise). Inferences do not 
change (results not shown).  
We have checked for the sensitivity of the results to individual states. To rule out this 
possibility, we have performed the regressions again, excluding one state at a time. Overall, 
the inferences are robust in that they are not subject to the inclusion of particular states. The 
influence  of  the  election  variables  declines,  however,  when  Schleswig-Holstein  and  the 
Saarland are excluded (results not shown). 
Other economic variables capturing population, the industry and employment structure 
and  the  fiscal  equalization  scheme  may  influence  ALMP  in  the  German  states.  We  have 
therefore controlled for these influences. Data on population, the industry and employment 
structure and the fiscal equalization scheme are, however, only available at an annual level.
11 
We have therefore aggregated our monthly data to yearly data. The results in Table 5 show 
that employing annual data also points to an electoral cycle in ALMP. We have included an 
election year dummy variable that assumes the value of one in election years and is zero 
otherwise. The post-election year variable assumes the value of one in post-election years and 
                                                 
11  We  employ  data  by  the  German  Federal  Statistical  Office  on  the  number  of  firms  and  the  number  of 
employees in these firms in the manufacturing sector. The fiscal equalization variable captures the horizontal 
fiscal equalization system and equals the real amount of money which the individual state received (positive 
amount) or spent (negative amount) in period t. 11 
 
is zero otherwise. The  election  year variable is statistically significant  at the 5% level in 
columns  (1)  and  (3)  and  at  the  10%  level  in  column  (2).  The  numerical  meaning  of  the 
coefficient of the election year variable is that the growth rate of the number of individuals in 
job-creation schemes increased by about 4% in election years. By contrast, the post-election 
year variable does not turn out to be statistically significant. In column (4), the election year 
variable lacks statistical significance at conventional levels. The results in columns (2) and (4) 
refer  to  regressions  in  which  we  have  employed  Bruno's  (2005a,  2005b)  dynamic  bias 
corrected estimator.
12 The lagged dependent variable is statistically significant at the 5% level 
in column (2) and at the 10% level in column (4). The variable "Left" does not turn out to be 
statistically  significant.  The  lagged  growth  rate  of  the  unemployment  rate  is  statistically 
significant at the 1% level in columns (1) to (4) and has the expected positive sign. Neither 
the  population,  nor  the  number  of  firms,  nor  the  number  of  employees,  nor  the  fiscal 
equalization variables turn out to be statistically significant. In any event, including these 
variables does not change the inferences regarding the election variables at all. 
 
5. Conclusion 
ALMP  measures  directly  reduce  unemployment  figures  and  sugar-coat  unemployment 
statistics. Electoral motives can thus explain why governments have implemented so many 
ALMP  programs  and  spent  so  much  money  on  these  programs.  We  have  tested  whether 
election motivated politicians use ALMP policies for manipulation using data for the German 
                                                 
12 We have mentioned above that in the context of dynamic estimation, the common fixed-effect estimator is 
biased by 1/T. As T is significantly smaller with annual data, we need to correct for the bias now. The estimators 
that take into account the resulting bias can be broadly grouped into a class of instrumental estimators and a class 
of direct bias corrected estimators (see Behr 2003, for example, for a discussion). In accordance with large 
sample properties of the GMM methods, e.g., the estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) will be 
biased in our econometric model with N=10. For this reason, bias corrected estimators are more appropriate. 
Bruno (2005a, 2005b) presents a bias corrected least squares dummy variable estimator for dynamic panel data 
models with small N which we apply. We choose the Blundell-Bond (1998) estimator as the initial estimator in 
which the instruments are collapsed as suggested by Roodman (2006). This procedure makes sure to avoid using 
invalid and too many instruments (see Roodman 2006 and 2009 for further details). Following Bloom et al. 
(2007) we undertake 50 repetitions of the procedure to bootstrap the estimated standard errors. 12 
 
states from 1985:1 to 2004:11 and find that ALMP in the form of job-creation schemes were 
pushed before elections.  
The empirical findings have important implications for studies in Public Choice and 
Labor Economics. Electoral cycles in ALMP can be tested for other countries in which the 
effectiveness of ALMP programs has been controversial. Empirical studies could also employ 
other ALMP measures than job-creation schemes. Avenues for future research include the 
following questions: have electoral motives influenced training programs and wage subsidies 
to the same extent? Are some ALMP measures more prone to strategic considerations before 
elections? If yes: can these effects explain why some AMLP programs turn out to be less 
effective than others? 
An important question for future research is whether expansionary policies (ALMP as 
well as other economic policies) before elections indeed improve the incumbent's re-election 
prospects. Our results suggest that political cycles in ALMP occur but we cannot draw any 
conclusions on the actual importance of expansionary ALMP for re-election purposes. When 
opportunistic behavior pays, politicians may well proceed boosting the economy in order to 
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Figure 1: Number of individuals in job-creation schemes in the West German states in the 
period 1984:12-2004:11. 
 
Source: German Federal Employment Office 
 
 
Figure 2: Number of unemployed persons in the West German states in the period 1984:12-
2004:11. 
 
Source: German Federal Employment Office 18 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics. 
Variable  Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max  Source 
Monthly data             
Job Creation Schemes  2390  6326.23  6440.11  172  30711  Federal Employment 
Agency 
Unemployed Persons  2390  231364.50  211696.90  33679  921330  Federal Employment 
Agency 
Election (12)  2390  0.24  0.43  0  1  own calculation 
Post-Election (12)  2390  0.24  0.43  0  1  own calculation 
Election (12) 
predetermined  2390  0.22  0.41  0  1  own calculation 
Election (12) endogenous  2390  0.02  0.13  0  1  own calculation 
Federal Election (12)  2390  0.25  0.43  0  1  own calculation 
Left  2390  0.61  0.47  0  1  Potrafke (2011) 
SPD  2390  0.34  0.47  0  1  Potrafke (2011) 
SPD/FDP  2390  0.11  0.31  0  1  Potrafke (2011) 
SPD/GR  2390  0.13  0.34  0  1  Potrafke (2011) 
CDU/SPD  2390  0.07  0.25  0  1  Potrafke (2011) 
CDU/FDP  2390  0.15  0.36  0  1  Potrafke (2011) 
CDU  2390  0.20  0.40  0  1  Potrafke (2011) 
             
Annual data             
Job Creation Schemes  200  6308.09  6401.36  236.27  29536.92 
Federal Employment 
Agency 
Unemployment rate  200  9.58  2.68  3.729167  16.77917 
Federal Employment 
Agency 
Election (12)  200  0.25  0.43  0  1  own calculation 
Post-Election (12)  200  0.24  0.43  0  1  own calculation 
Election (12) 
predetermined  200  0.23  0.42  0  1  own calculation 
Election (12) endogenous  200  0.02  0.14  0  1  own calculation 
Federal Election (12)  200  0.25  0.43  0  1  own calculation 
Left  200  0.62  0.47  0  1  Potrafke (2011) 
SPD  200  0.29  0.45  0  1  Potrafke (2011) 
SPD/FDP  200  0.11  0.31  0  1  Potrafke (2011) 
SPD/GR  200  0.19  0.39  0  1  Potrafke (2011) 
CDU/SPD  200  0.07  0.26  0  1  Potrafke (2011) 
CDU/FDP  200  0.16  0.37  0  1  Potrafke (2011) 
CDU  200  0.19  0.39  0  1  Potrafke (2011) 
Total population  
(in thousands)  200  6289.68  5241.20  660.10  18075.10  Federal Statistical Office 
Enterprises  200  4210.855  3799.453  331  11905  Federal Statistical Office 
Employees in Enterprises  200  627775.1  579617.1  60608  2037956  Federal Statistical Office 
Fiscal equalization  200  -52.11486  1009.377 
-








Table 2. Regression Results. Dependent Variable: Growth rate of the number of job creation 
schemes. Heteroskedastic and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) Newey-West type standard 
errors. Monthly data. 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
  FGLS  FGLS  FGLS 
Election (12)  0.0043*  0.0039**  0.0027* 
  [1.91]  [2.30]  [1.86] 
Post-Election (12)  0.0007  0.0009  0.0005 
  [0.40]  [0.52]  [0.40] 
Left  0.0009  0.0018  0.0012 
  [0.64]  [1.35]  [1.42] 
Lags Dependent Variable    Lag 1.-12.   
Lags Unemployed Persons    Lag 1.-12.   
Lagged Dependent Variable (t-1)      0.3975*** 
      [11.52] 
∆ ln Unemployed Persons (t-4)      0.0428 
      [1.63] 
Fixed State Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Fixed Year Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Fixed Monthly Effects (Seasonality)  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  2380  2279  2359 
Number of N  10  10  10 
R-Squared (overall)  0.22  0.38  0.33 



























Table 3. Regression Results. Dependent Variable: Growth rate of the number of job creation 
schemes. Heteroskedastic and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) Newey-West type standard 
errors. Monthly data. 
Regular and irregular elections. 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  FGLS  FGLS  FGLS  FGLS 
Election (regular)  0.0046**  0.0046**  0.0029**  0.0029** 
  [2.48]  [2.38]  [2.36]  [2.31] 
Election (irregular)  -0.0033  -0.0028  -0.0025  -0.0023 
  [0.60]  [0.53]  [0.66]  [0.60] 
Left  0.0004    0.0008   
  [0.25]    [0.86]   
SPD/FDP    0.0009    0.0004 
    [0.73]    [0.50] 
SPD/GR    0.0028    0.0014 
    [1.54]    [1.25] 
CDU/SPD    0.0043***    0.0022** 
    [4.79]    [2.80] 
CDU/FDP    0.0004    -0.0003 
    [0.27]    [0.31] 
CDU    0.0005    -0.0006 
    [0.14]    [0.31] 
Lagged Dependent Variable      0.3971***  0.3963*** 
      [11.27]  [11.07] 
∆ ln Unemployed Persons (t-4)      0.0423  0.0423 
      [1.62]  [1.62] 
Fixed State Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Fixed Year Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Fixed Monthly Effects (Seasonality)  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  2380  2380  2359  2359 
Number of N  10  10  10  10 
R-Squared (overall)  0.20  0.20  0.33  0.33 




















Table 4. Regression Results. Dependent Variable: Growth rate of the number of job creation 
schemes. Heteroskedastic and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) Newey-West type standard 
errors. Monthly data. 
Federal elections considered. 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  FGLS  FGLS  FGLS  FGLS 
Election (12)  0.0044*  0.0043*  0.0028*  0.0028* 
  [1.99]  [1.95]  [1.96]  [1.94] 
Post-Election (12)  0.0007  0.0006  0.0005  0.0005 
  [0.36]  [0.33]  [0.37]  [0.34] 
Federal Election  0.0132***  0.0132***  0.0099***  0.0099*** 
  [5.77]  [5.77]  [6.51]  [6.51] 
Left  0.0010    0.0013   
  [0.69]    [1.50]   
SPD/FDP    0.0007    0.0003 
    [0.56]    [0.38] 
SPD/GR    0.0029    0.0015 
    [1.58]    [1.31] 
CDU/SPD    0.0040***    0.0020** 
    [4.42]    [2.50] 
CDU/FDP    -0.0002    -0.0008 
    [0.20]    [1.04] 
CDU    -1×10
-5    -0.001 
    [0.00]    [0.53] 
Lagged Dependent Variable      0.3896***  0.3887*** 
      [11.72]  [11.48] 
∆ ln Unemployed Persons (t-4)      0.0427  0.0427 
      [1.61]  [1.61] 
Fixed State Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Fixed Year Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Fixed Monthly Effects (Seasonality)  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  2221  2380  2200  2359 
Number of N  10  10  10  10 
R-Squared (overall)  0.21  0.21  0.33  0.33 


















Table 5. Regression Results. Dependent Variable: Growth rate of the number of job creation 
schemes. Heteroskedastic and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) Newey-West type standard 
errors and dynamic bias corrected estimator. Annual data. 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  FGLS  FGLS  FGLS  FGLS 
Election   0.0434**  0.0437*  0.0373**  0.037 
  [2.45]  [1.93]  [2.30]  [1.56] 
Post-Election   0.009  0.0002  0.005  -0.0022 
  [0.30]  [0.01]  [0.17]  [0.09] 
Left  0.0116  0.022  0.0018  0.0146 
  [0.28]  [0.56]  [0.04]  [0.37] 
∆ ln Unemployment rate (t-1)  0.6593**  0.7215***  0.7648***  0.8166*** 
  [3.00]  [2.82]  [3.29]  [3.10] 
∆ ln Total Population      5.576  4.1689 
      [1.20]  [0.75] 
∆ ln Enterprises      0.8793  0.8633 
      [1.45]  [1.01] 
∆ ln Employees in Enterprises      0.0127  0.0725 
      [0.02]  [0.06] 
Fiscal Equalization      -8×10
-6  -6×10
-6 
      [0.41]  [0.34] 
Lagged Dependent Variable    0.1552**    0.1290* 
    [2.08]    [1.69] 
Fixed State Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Fixed Year Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  190  180  190  180 
Number of N  10  10  10  10 
R-Squared (overall)  0.73    0.73   
Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 